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The Spectre of Globalization
DR. TIM DUNNE*
INTRODUCTION
The year 1492 marked a crucial turning point in the history of
international relations. Columbus "discovered" the Americas, bringing
European values into contact with the other great Western civilizations. In the
same year, the Moors were expelled from Spain; Europe had been reclaimed
for white Europeans; and the conquest of the Americas meant that there was
only one continent that remained untouched by European conceptions of law,
politics, and religion. Three centuries later, Captain Cook "discovered" this
landmass they called the "great southern continent." As the colonization of
Australia was underway, Cook's one-time fellow explorer and naturalist,
Watkin Tench, noted in his diary how regrettable it was that he was stuck in
Australia while a revolution was happening in France. But he need not have
been so down on his luck. With hindsight, the French revolution was part of
the locomotive of modernity that had propelled Tench on his journey. These
two voyages represent metaphors for the expansion of European culture to the
non-European world. The explorers believed themselves to be charged with
an epistemic responsibility to "map" uncharted territory, and to bring home
samples of plant life and descriptions of "natives."
Of course, the motivations for these voyages of "discovery" were soon
eclipsed by traditional concerns of realpolitik. The Americas were extremely
rich in resources; by colonizing them, Spain was able to underline her great
power status. Australia was not valued initially for its potential to enhance
Britain's international reputation, but to solve a domestic problem of the
criminal underclass. It was to be a vast open prison for murderers, petty
criminals, and undesirables, such as prostitutes and political troublemakers.
Compare these motivations with those of Columbus and Cook who believed
* Tim Dunne is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales,
Aberystwyth. In 1998, his book, INVENTING INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH
SCHOOL, was published by Macmillan (and St. Martin's in the United States). He has co-edited a number
of books, including HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS, and THE EIGHTY YEARS' CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1919-1999, both with Cambridge University Press.
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themselves to be expanding the knowable universe. Ironically, these two
explorers had romantic images of the indigenous peoples: Would they have
set sail had they known of the genocidal consequences of their voyages? This
rupture between the motives and the outcomes illustrates what critical
theorists in our own century have termed the dark side of modernity.
Since Columbus's era, the passage of modernity has seen a transformation
in our thinking about space and time. These voyages of discovery expanded
conceptions of space to fill the entire globe; from that moment on, space has
become compressed over time. In Marx's famous dictum, the modern age is
characterized by "the annihilation of space through time." The fact that we
can share the same images with someone on the other side of the world, or
even conduct simultaneous financial transactions, has transformed our spatial
geography. This transformation has led David Harvey to speculate that the
world of the 1990s is about one-fiftieth the size of the world of the sixteenth
century because aircrafts travel at fifty times the speed of sailing ships.'
At the time that Columbus set sail for the Americas, human consciousness
was framed by a pre-modern belief system. South of the equator, seawater
was thought to bubble at boiling point, and dragons were said to stalk the
"great southern continent." In the intervening five centuries, universal forms
of human organization have evolved through the development of science,
political economy, social order, and the system of States. A key question for
theorists of globalization is how far recent changes in communication,
technology, trade flows, and identity relations actually constitute a
fundamentally different kind of international order. Is globalization, in other
words, more than the highest stage of modernization, which has been
underway for centuries?2
This Article will steer a course between the "transformationalists," who
believe that globalization is a qualitatively different period in human history,
and the "skeptics" at the other end of the spectrum who believe that nothing
fundamental has changed. It was this line of thinking that led the realist
thinker Robert Gilpin to speculate that students of International Relations at
I. MALCOLM WATERS, GLOBALIZATION 55 (1995).
2. There are a variety of definitions of globalization in the literature, but none are very helpful. Held
and McGrew define it as "an [sic] historical process which transforms the spatial organization of social
relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or inter-regional networks of interaction and the
exercise of power." David Held & Anthony McGrew, The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the
Prospects for World Order, in THE EIGHTY YEARS' CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1919-1999,220
(Tim Dunne et al. eds., 1998). Malcolm Waters defines it as "[a] social process in which the constraints
of geography-on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware
that they are receding." WATERS, supra note i, at 3.
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the end of the twentieth century do not know any more about the subject than
spectators in the Peloponnesian Wars twenty-five centuries ago. The extent
to which the contemporary globalized order differs from previous
international orders will be examined in Part I of this Article.
Those who subscribe to the strong globalization thesis, who think the new
order is best understood as a discontinuity from the past, claim that the
clinching argument is that the sovereign State is being "hollowed out." In
other words, it is being undermined by new political actors (institutions and
non-governmental organizations) and ever more powerful economic forces
(transnational corporations and global financial markets). Part II challenges
the way in which this issue is framed in much of the globalization literature.
Instead of thinking about a transfer of power from the State to transnational
companies and global regimes, it is more appropriate to think about the way
in which States are transforming-as well as being transformed by-the process
of globalization.
Having looked at the historical debate about the origins of globalization,
and the dispute about the capacity of States to control their environment in the
current global order, Part III will consider the normative dimension. This
dimension is frequently overlooked in the literature on globalization, in part
because much of the work is concerned with an empirical dispute about the
extent to which patterns of economic activity are changing.' Yet politics is all
about who gets what, why, and how. Bringing the normative back into the
globalization debate leads us to the question: "Who gains from the global
order?" Aside from the new metropolitan elites accumulating wealth and
power, it is important to ask whether the culture of modernity brings with it
the possibility of developing what Hedley Bull described as a growing
"cosmopolitan moral awareness."4 Many would argue that the universal
human rights regime is the best example of how the global order has a social
as well as an economic dimension. But how far are economic considerations
narrowing the space within which States can promote redistributive justice?
Is the spectre of globalization haunting the efforts of social democrats to
widen and deepen moral solidarity among peoples of the world? This thought
takes us into the complex question about whether the rules and institutions of
international society are able to provide for the conditions of justice in the
3. In Ian Clark's words, "[tihe vast majority of globalization theorists present it as a characteristic
of economic activity." IAN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 21 (1997).
4. HEDLEY BULL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 18 (1984).
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global order. It is this line of argument that propels exponents of liberalism
to wonder how far concepts like transnational citizenship and global
governance can bridge the democratic deficit in the contemporary global
order.
I. A NEW GLOBAL ORDER?
Like most concepts in politics and international relations, the meaning of
globalization is contested. This is the principal reason why it is necessary to
bring philosophical and sociological insights to bear on the study of
globalization. Since globalization is not apparent to our sensory
experiences-though of course we may be able to observe some of its
effects-we need theoretical tools to guide us in framing the appropriate kinds
of questions to ask. Social theory can also help us think through how the
various elements of the global order "hang together."5 What, for example, is
the relationship between material power (e.g., technology), and patterns of
domination in global politics? Or should we think of the evolving global order
as being shaped by structures made up of inter-subjectively constituted rules,
norms, and expectations? If this is the case, why do actors obey these
norms-because they are compelled to or because they believe them to be
legitimate? By asking reflective questions about the ontology of the global
order, it is possible to make some progress towards answering these weighty
questions. Too much of the existing globalization literature is empiricist in
its orientation, assuming that these questions can be avoided and the "real"
work can begin without such inconvenient metatheoretical distractions.
An obvious ontological point of departure is to insist on a definition of
globalization. One of the most widely used is Anthony Giddens's suggestion
that globalization represents "the intensification of worldwide social relations
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by
events occurring many miles away and vice versa."6 But beneath this
accessible description lie many layers of complexity. Does it matter that the
interdependence between the local and the global is asymmetrical? In other
words, some local events in the "Third World" have almost no impact upon
5. I am following Alexander Wendt's injunction to consider social theory as a separate but
necessarily prior activity to explaining patterns of international relations. See his brilliant new book,
ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).
6. Anthony Giddens, quoted in Jan Aart Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS 14, 15 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997).
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the global order, whereas decisions on world debt taken by the "G8" countries
resonate through every political and economic sphere. The definition also
elides the issue of what counts as a "locality." These questions aside, one of
the most important issues prompted by Giddens's definition is how much
intensification is required for us to recognize the current order as being
qualitatively different from other phases in international politics?
"How does newness come into the world?" This profound question, posed
by Salman Rushdie, is one that has framed much of the globalization
literature. The answer given by "globalists" is that the global sphere refers to
an intensification of transborder networks and flows. The emphasis here is
upon the rise of economic actors who view the world as their market.
Production is no longer located in one country but brings several countries
into the complex process of research, design, assembly, and finally, the export
of the finished item around the world. Firms are not the only actors to unsettle
the sovereign system of States. Globalists point to the myriad of transborder
social movements, some taking the form of campaigning organizations such
as Greenpeace and Amnesty International, others concerning networks of
religious groups channeling information and coordinating their activities.
Defenders of globalization differ over the extent to which the degree of
"intensification" constitutes a different kind of order. Charlotte Bretherton,
for example, argues that globalization represents "a new, distinct phase in
world politics."7  Others see it as simply a more advanced form of
internationalization or even reducible to the emergence of capitalism itself.'
Exponents of a longer history of globalization alert us to the importance of
colonial expansion in establishing a single capitalist system. As Held and
colleagues put it, "undoubtedly, the rapidly developing empires of Britain and
of other European states were the most powerful agents of globalization in the
late nineteenth century."9 Managing overseas colonies was a costly business,
a factor that contributed to the desire among the European imperial powers to
establish indirect forms of control. Agreements over imperial spheres of
influence in the second half of the -nineteenth century, as well as the
establishment of more technical regimes to regulate communication and trade,
are the earliest forms of deterritorialization ofdecisionmaking. A much more
extensive deterritorialization of governance is central to the liberal
globalization narrative at the end of the twentieth century.
7. CLARK, supra note 3, at 19.
8. See WATERS, supra note I, at 36.
9. DAVID HELD & ANTHONY McGREw, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS 41 (1999).
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Technological changes are uppermost on the agenda of advocates of the
distinctiveness of globalization. The time it takes to communicate with
someone in another part of the world has been reduced to "instant time"
through the use of telephone, facsimile, and electronic mail. It would be
unwise to underestimate the potential of the Internet and the global media to
facilitate the exchange of information.' The cost of making a three-minute
call from New York to London fell from $245 in 1939-in 1990 prices-to 35
cents in 1999. But these changes mask an unevenness about the advances; an
unevenness that is so great it should make us pause to reflect on whether these
patterns are really global in scope. While over a quarter of all U.S. citizens
are Internet users, this contrasts significantly with the fact that the figure is
less than one percent for Latin America, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Eastern
Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Arab States, sub-Saharan
Africa, and South Asia." Given this data, it is hard to resist one of the
conclusions of the United Nations Development Report that noted the
following paradox of globalization: "The collapse of space, time and borders
may be creating a global village, but not everyone can be a citizen. The
global, professional elite faces low borders, but billions of others find borders
as high as ever."'
' 2
What the previous paragraphs imply is that there is little consensus on
when globalization began. As Foucault-following Nietzsche-reminds us, it
is futile to search for the origins of concepts. The history of ideas, to use a
Foucauldian metaphor, is a matter of shades of gray, rather than black and
white. Given that globalization is intimately connected to industrialization
and to modernity, it seems foolish to bracket globalization off from these
broader currents of Western political theory and practice. This has certainly
been the response by many sympathetic to the victims of the globalization
debate. As Martin Khor notes: "Globalization is what we in the Third World
have for several centuries called colonization."'"
10. For an in-depth examination of the relationship between the Internet and state sovereignty, see
Symposium, The Internet and the Sovereign State: The Role and Impact of Cyberspace on National and
Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 415 (1998).
II. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1999, Ch. 2 at 63 (visited
Nov. I, 1999) <http://www.undp.orghdro/report.html> [hereinafter UNDP].
12. Id. For more data on new technologies, see id. at ch. 2.
13. Martin Khor, quoted in Scholte, supra note 6, at 15.
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II. THE WANING STATE?
In the main, the theoretical literature on globalization in International
Relations is conceptually underdeveloped and largely devoid of serious
research into the ethical implications of the new global order.'4 Arguably, this
constitutes a significant disciplinary failing given that, more than any other
subject area, 5 International Relations is better suited to comprehending the
various interconnected aspects of the new global order, including: military
and security issues, internationalization of markets, phenomena of regional
integration, and the normative possibilities for cosmopolitan ethics. This
failure has been accentuated by the fact that the other social sciences, and
even some of the humanities, have incorporated globalization into their
various research programs.6
What is the explanation for the inability of International Relations to take
the lead in thinking about globalization? One answer lies in the failure to
adequately conceptualize the State, an alarming thought given that "[t]he
,,17starting point of international relations is the existence of states ....
Before thinking about the representation of the State in the globalization
debate, it is worth reflecting on how the State has been treated by
conventional International Relations theories in recent times. For the last
thirty years, liberalism-or pluralism as it was called in the 1970s-has been
largely obsessed with a descriptive account of the "sovereignty at bay" thesis.
In other words, liberals believed that power was leaking from States to non-
State actors (a legacy which continues to inform much of the globalization
literature, as argued below). Realists, on the other hand, have stubbornly
resisted the argument that State power is in decline. For them, the context
14. A recent exception to this is [an Clark's new book, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY (1999).
15. Malcolm Waters, in the conclusion to his book on GLOBALIZATION, made a strong plea for
sociology to colonize the study of globalization. His argument in the book, however, was a descriptive
account of the changing cultural and technological environment; it was devoid of any attempt to theorize
the relationship between the various sectors mentioned in the text above. Moreover, he characterized
International Relations' (IR) focus on the State in very crude terms: "They [IR] retain a commitment to the
continuing saliency of relations between States but accept that economic and cultural integrations develop
along side them." WATERS, supra note I, at 27.
16. Sociology in particular is taking a leading role in the early studies of globalization and its
dynamics. See U. BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1992); see also GLOBAL CULTURE
(Mike Featherstone ed., 1990); SCOTT LASH & JOHN URRY, ECONOMIES OF SIGNS AND SPACE (1994);
WATERS, supra note I.
17. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 8 (2d ed.
1995).
24 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 7:17
might have changed but the primacy of the national interest remains. Marxists
have taken the opposite view, this time privileging-almost exclusively-the
"logic of capital" and thereby underestimating the political and legal
dimensions of the international order. 18
There are good reasons for believing that our theorization of the State is
considerably more sophisticated today. Social constructivism has provided
new tools for comprehending the relationship between States and the wider
forces in the international system. 9 The first aspect of the constructivist
contribution draws our attention to the fact that diplomats and State leaders
have agency; but crucially, the spectrum of choices facing them is constrained
by layers of legal principles-what Mervyn Frost has called the "settled norms"
of the system.2 ° The interrelationship between the agents and the rules and
norms constitutes the structure of international society. Constructivists also
draw our attention to the fact that sovereignty is not an empirical fact but a
fundamental expression of an identity relationship. There cannot be sovereign
States without shared understandings and expectations of what it means to be
a sovereign; "there is no sovereignty without an other."'" Certain legal rules
are implied by the mutual recognition of sovereignty; the principal one is of
course the requirement of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other
States. It is a constitutive rule of the society of States in so far as the latter has
no meaning independently of that rule.
Instead of seeing the State as an ahistorical category, as Realism suggests,
we need to understand the State-and its legal sign of sovereignty-as a
historically and socially constructed community. Three hundred and fifty
years after the treaties of Westphalia that established the autonomy of States,
the United Nations (UN) begins its Charter with the claim that "the
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members."22 Sovereignty therefore continues to be the "badge" of belonging
in international society. Similarly, with the case of the nonintervention rule,
Article 2.4 of the UN Charter states that "all Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
18. For example, Justin Rosenberg overstates the degree to which the State is an instrumental effect
of the capitalist order. In hii words, "'sovereignty needs to be understood historically as a form of political
rule peculiar to capitalism." JUSTIN ROSENBERG, THE EMPIRE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: A CRITIQUE OF THE
REALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 123 (1994).
19. See, e.g., RODNEY BRUCE HALL, NATIONAL COLLECTIVE IDENTITY (1999).
20. See generally MERVYN FROST, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY
(1996).
2 1. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992).
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. I.
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integrity or the political independence of any state . ,,.23 Not only are
sovereignty and nonintervention written into the constitution of international
society, they are presupposed in the daily rounds of diplomacy. They are so
taken for granted, in fact, that it is easy to forget how they continue to
determine the conditions of the possible in international relations. Early
theorists of globalization often made the mistake of confusing the
reproduction of sovereignty as a legal norm with the question of whether the
State's power was waning in relation to non-State actors. More importantly,
much of the literature on the "declining" State thesis overlooks the extent to
which States remain crucial actors in the global order.
How do we begin to assess the extent to which the transnationalization of
production, trade, and finance has eclipsed the role of the State? It would be
wrong to argue that there has not been a proliferation of new actors in
international relations at the end of the century. Today it is possible for
"private" economic actors to challenge the policies of established States, as
was brutally illustrated when George Soros effectively forced the British
pound sterling out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. The influence
of media tycoons like Rupert Murdoch is another high profile example of
private individuals exercising enormous public power; the hostility of the
Murdoch press towards the Labour party in Britain in the 1980s undoubtedly
contributed to the general view that they were "unelectable." 24
There is a danger, however, in mistaking a few high profile cases of
entrepreneurs successfully "taking on the State," for a general shift in
economic power from the State to non-State actors. Some defenders of the
strong globalization thesis fall into this trap. Kenichi Ohmae, for example,
speaks of "Stateless" corporations as though they are the dominant agents in
an integrated world economy. The historical evidence, however, does not
support this argument. In their powerful critique of the "strong" globalization
thesis, Hirst and Thompson offer the following counters. First, levels of
integration among capitalist economies prior to 1919 were higher than in the
1990s. Second, multinational corporations have distinct biases towards their
home markets. Put these two arguments together, and they conclude that
"international businesses are still largely confined to their home territory in
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
24. A vivid illustration of this can be seen from the front page of The Sun on the eve of the 1987
general election. The image had a picture ofNeil Kinnock's head in a light-bulb beneath the headline "will
the last person to leave the country, please turn out the lights!" The Sun is Britain's most popular
newspaper, with sales consistently over 3 million and a readership of up to 10 million.
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terms of their overall business activity .... This means that it is not beyond
the powers of national governments to regulate these companies."25 The
tendency to dismiss the State has prompted one leading International Relations
theorist to argue that this "undermines the value of a great deal of work that
goes by the title 'globalization."' 26
Linda Weiss has also mounted a fierce challenge to the "State power
erosion" argument that underpins much of the globalization literature. 7 One
obvious problem with the hyper-globalizer's position is the inference that, in
the past, States had high levels of autonomy and control. If this was indeed
the case, it can be put down to the stability afforded to national economies by
internationally agreed rules for controlling the price of money (i.e., fixed
exchange rates). One other key counter to the "erosion" thesis concerns the
capacity of States to invent new ways of bringing economic issues back under
their authority. The widespread tendency within Western States to promote
"star" firms by giving them generous subsidies, and the practice of using
diplomatic contacts to gain export orders, arejust two examples of an informal
economic renationalization process. Mega-corporations like Ford, Exxon,
Royal Dutch, British Petroleum, British Aerospace, Toyota, and so on are far
too important for their fate to remain outside the reach of their government.
Advocates of globalization often point to the rise of new transnational
actors as evidence of the unraveling of the Westphalian triangle of people,
government, and territory. In this respect, "transnational civil society" has
become a catch-all term to include the various non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) such as aid agencies, political networks, and so on. The
more "hyper-globalist" thinking on globalization sees transnational civil
society as pulling in the opposite direction of States. Yet, Woods and Hurrell
are surely right to argue that transnational civil society stands in a more
ambiguous relationship to States.2" First, many campaigning international
NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace, are in many respects
extensions of liberal values found in Western States. Moreover, without the
freedom and security provided by countries like France, in the case of
Midecins Sans Fronti~res, or Britian, in the case of Oxfam, it is unlikely that
25. PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALISATION IN QUESTION 98 (1996).
26. CHRIS BROWN, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 169-70 (1997).
27. Linda Weiss, Globalization and Governance: Antinomy or Interdependence, in THE
INTERREGNUM: CONTROVERSIES IN WORLD POLITICS, 1989-1999 (Michael Cox et al. eds., forthcoming
1999).
28. Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods, Globalisation and Inequality, MILLENNIUM 24.3, 447-70
(1995).
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these groups would survive, let alone flourish. Second, many liberal and
social democratic States are involving these organizations in the public policy
process. They can provide vital "on the ground" information about the
unfolding of particular crises, and often government money is channeled
through them as it is usually the most effective way of getting resources to the
victims. As well as being involved in the implementation of foreign and
security policy, NGOs are increasingly being involved in the formulation of
policy. In the case of Britain's much vaunted "ethical foreign policy" under
New Labour, the Foreign Secretary has sought the advice of NGOs far more
than "the men in gray suits" who run the Royal Institute of International
Affairs.
In both spheres of politics and economics, it is neither apparent that
globalization is replacing the sovereign State, nor is it clear that States are
able to control their own economies and territories in the same way that was
possible in the era of raison d'etat. The problem is being incorrectly framed.
This error can be seen from Camilleri and Falk's view that "global processes
and institutions are invading the nation-state and as a consequence dismantling
the conceptual and territorial boundaries that have traditionally sustained the
theory and practice of state sovereignty."29  Even if States were being
"invaded" by "global processes"-notice that the old Westphalian militaristic
metaphors remain intact-this does not mean that the more penetrated an
economy becomes, the more State sovereignty is undermined. For example,
the Canadian economy is completely dependent on the United States, which
is Canada's dominant investor and trading partner. But it is no less sovereign
politically because of this economic dependence. Indeed, the question of
sovereignty in Canada is contested far more by clashing identities "inside" the
State, as opposed to invading economic forces from the "outside."
What is at stake here are different understandings of ontology. The
participants in the "either globalization or State sovereignty" debate have been
working with an under-theorized conception of ontology. Sovereignty is not
so much on the wane as it is changing because ofthe different meanings actors
give to what counts as a sovereign State. As Part III of this Article makes
29. JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING
AND FRAGMENTING GLOBE 98 (1992). A more cautious "transformative" view ofglobalization is provided
by Mark Zacher: "[Tihis appears to be a time when it is possible to judge that the world is in the process
of a fundamental transformation from a system of highly autonomous states to one where states are
increasingly enmeshed in a network of independencies and regimes." Mark Zacher, The Decaying Pillars
of the Westphalian Temple, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS 58, 98 (James N.Rosenau & Emst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
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clear, the inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty have changed in the
post-1945 period. It is philosophically incoherent to separate the economic
from the political; as Hirst and Thompson rightly argue, "the world trading
system has never just been an 'economy,' a distinct system governed by its
own laws. '30 A theoretically more complex look at the same argument, drawn
from social constructivism, tells us that markets are constituted by and through
social interaction. They do not function independently of a cultural context,
indicating why some products are more valued than others. The fact that gold
meant little to Amerindian leaders such as Montezuma was not simply because
of its relative abundance; it was because their societies-unlike ours-did not
value gold as a symbol of power and beauty.
Global social and economic processes are not independent of the rule
structure of international society; sometimes they outstrip the capacity of
international institutions to regulate them, other times they demonstrate their
continuing resilience.3' Both sectors need to be seen as constitutive of the
global order. The key issue for more empirically minded scholars is the
clarification of the relationship between the regulatory rules and constitutive
norms, and their capacity to adapt to the changing economic circumstances.
In this sense, understanding the ontology of the global order leads directly into
an analysis of the institutions of governance. State power is crucial to the
emergence of strong global institutions for the regulation of violence, political
economy, and technology. To borrow from the constructivist axiom, what the
preceding paragraphs suggest is that globalization is what States have made
of it. 2 States themselves have established the rules and institutions to
maintain order amid the diversity of their cultures. Moreover, it would be a
mistake to think that the historical process leading towards great political and
economic integration was somehow irreversible.
1II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE NARROWING MORAL HORIZON
As noted above, one of the central aspects of the "strong" globalization
thesis is the argument that States are no longer autonomous actors; they now
30. HIRST& THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 14.
31. As Wight said of Burke, "European international society was more resiliant than Burke feared."
The same could be said in response to the hyper-globalizer's view of the State and the society of States.
See Martin Wight, Western Values, in DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS (Herbert Butterfield & Martin Wight
eds., 1966).
32. Adapting Wendt's famous phrase from the title of his article: "Anarchy is what states make of
it." Wendt, supra note 21, at 43.
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find themselves embedded in a web of institutions and regimes. What is
interesting about the debate between "strong" global izers and critical skeptics
is that it is very much framed as an empirical problem. Neither set of
protagonists tends to turn their minds to the normative dimension." Making
explicit what is often implicit, it is possible to draw out the contours of a
normative defense of globalization: first, according to neo-liberal economic
theory, the globalization of economic markets will reduce inequality; second,
the creation of international institutions will further increase incentives for
cooperation; and third, globalization brings with it ideological convergence.
The fall of communism led many politicians and academics to argue that there
is no alternative to the neo-liberal values associated with privatization, low
taxation, open markets, and a minimalist conception of government.
One way of describing the "hidden" normative agenda underpinning
globalization has been offered by Hurrell and Woods. They refer to the liberal
narrative as the "progressive enmeshment" thesis. 4 In other words, actors
outside of the "northern" metropolitan hub of globalization have consciously
acceded to neo-liberal values. Set against this view is the "coercive
socialization" model that maintains that the transmission of neo-liberal values
is being propelled by hegemonic centers of power. Of course, "G8" States are
key agents in shaping the agenda of the major financial institutions and in
imposing conditions on poorer countries prior to receipt of investment and
even aid. Accordingly, States outside the "hub" have little or no agency to
resist this socialization process. In this sense, the spectre of globalization is
a significant constraint upon the capacity of Third World countries to organize
their economic and social policies on anything other than neo-liberal grounds.
It is perhaps useful to pause and consider where this discussion is leading.
The early part of this Article questioned the widespread assumption that
globalization constitutes a unique phase of modernity. This argument was
further strengthened by a critical examination of the globalization thesis that
the power of States is being eroded. Here, an important qualification needs
to be made. The power of wealthy northern States is not being eroded, despite
"'common sense' assumptions that states" can no longer afford universal
33. A plea to bring globalization and theories ofjustice together has recently been made by Richard
Devetak and Richard Higgot in Justice Unbound? Globalization, States and the Transformation of the
Social Bond, 75 INT'L AFF. 483 (1999).
34. Hurrell & Woods, supra note 28, at 457.
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welfare payments and adequate social services." But in the developing world,
poorer States are unable to meet even the most basic international human
rights standards-such as universal education for all primary school children.
What this calls for is a greater awareness of the uneven process of
globalization, and a concomitant need to think of new ways of bringing justice
to bear on the dynamic global political economy.
As argued above, State sovereignty remains fundamental to the normative
structure of international relations. Not because it represents an idealized
form of community, but in the main for the simple reason that there is no other
alternative. Yet, if we turn our attention to the evolving global human rights
culture, we see that in the post-1945 world the particularism of sovereignty
has been normatively constrained by the universalism embodied in the human
rights regime. Again, this underscores the importance of considering the
mutual dependence of sovereignty and global social and economic forces, as
opposed to viewing them as pulling in opposite directions.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), signed just over
fifty years ago, established a standard of civilized conduct which applies to all
governments in the treatment of their citizens.36 For example, the UDHR
requires States to provide subsistence needs and basic welfare, as well as a
panoply of civil and political rights." Although the latter assumed
prominence in the subsequent history of the post-1945 regime, it is important
to underscore that from the outset, universal human rights encompassed a
concern for positive rights (such as collective provisions of education and
health care) as well as negative rights (such as freedom from repressive
government policies).
The framers of these basic documents assumed that there was no
necessary conflict between the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention
and respect for universal human rights. This represented a historic evolution
in the norms of international society that, from the seventeenth century
onwards, maintained that the domestic practices of governments were not a
subject of international concern. According to the Westphalian conception of
legitimacy, a government's claim to be recognized as a sovereign was not
dependent upon how it behaved towards its own citizens. As a consequence
35. As Linda Weiss notes, the "crisis" in welfare provisions in many liberal States has much more to
do with changing demographic and lifestyle changes than adjustments required by global economic forces.
Weiss, supra note 27.
36. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
37. Id.
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of the experiences of totalitarianism, governments recognized that there was
a need to challenge the Westphalian model of unlimited sovereignty. In these
emerging human rights norms, there was a clear consensus that States must be
made accountable for their behavior.
Underlying the evolution of human rights principles was the conviction
held by the framers of the UN Charter that there was a clear link between good
governance and the maintenance of international peace and security. It was
believed that the aggressive foreign policies of the Axis powers were caused
by the militaristic nature of their domestic political systems. Diplomats and
State leaders in the early post-1945 period endorsed the "democratic peace"
thesis that has been rejuvenated in the theory and practice of international
relations since the end of the Cold War. The manifesto for human rights and
international security contained within the UN Charter and the UDHR
represented, therefore, a radical assault on the existing principle of
international legitimacy. Sovereignty remained the constitutive norm of the
society of States, but the meaning that was given to sovereignty had been
modified. In R.J. Vincent's words, the way a government treats its people
exposes "the internal regimes of all the members of international society to the
legitimate appraisal of their peers. '"3"
Since the first wave of standard setting, successive decades have seen the
growing codification of human rights into both treaty and customary
international law. Along with this strengthening of the regime, there has
emerged a growing moral awareness within world public opinion of human
rights issues and concerns reflected in the existence of NGOs, such as
Amnesty International, which act as the conscience of the regime. An
informed and active citizenry has a crucial role to play in monitoring State
behavior for the reason that there is a disjuncture between the declaratory
commitments of governments to protect and promote human rights and their
compliance with these standards. For example, Amnesty International pointed
out in its 1997 report that of the world's 185 sovereign States, 123 routinely
practice torture.3 ' Even more striking is the fact that the crime of genocide,
which is outlawed by the 1950 Genocide Convention, has not been banished
from the practice of world politics as the appalling tragedy of Rwanda
illustrated in April 1994. In short, governments-many of whom drafted and
38. R.J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 152 (1986).
39. Amnesty International Annual Report 1997.
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signed the "International Bill of Rights"-have massively defaulted on their
normative commitments. 0
What is the explanation for this double standard (i.e., State leaders
engaging in human rights "talk" but not living up to their word)? One
possibility is that States can never be trusted. Power corrupts; therefore,
unless civil society is vibrant and vigilant, State leaders will ignore human
rights commitments.4 ' Richard Falk offers another set of reasons. He has
argued that economic globalization itself is undermining the capability of
many States to fulfill their obligations, especially with respect to welfare
issues and social justice. According to the neo-liberal orthodoxy, supply-side
macroeconomic measures will diffuse the benefits of economic growth to all
sectors in society. But, as Falk powerfully argues:
Factors associated with competitiveness, especially a fiscal
preoccupation with the reduction of trade and budgetary
deficits, tax reductions, and the avoidance of inflationary
pressures, add to the downward pressure on public goods.
When large companies cut their employment rolls the price
of their shares tends to rise in stock markets, while news of
a drop in unemployment tends to arouse fears of interest rate
increases, and send stock prices reeling. Such patterns are
characteristic of an era of globalization, with its logic
dictated by the well being of capital rather than of people.42
CONCLUSION
Falk's argument about the perils of economic globalization gets close to
the "waning State" thesis that was resisted earlier in this Article. However,
it is important to distinguish empirical and normative challenges to the State.
I have drawn upon the work of a number of globalization skeptics in order to
pour cold water on some of the more exaggerated claims of the "hyper-
40. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (Tim Dunne & Nicholas J.Wheeler eds., 1999),
for various theoretical and issue-specific attempts to critically reflect upon the stark contradiction between
the idea of universal human rights and practices of human wrongs. I am grateful to my friend and co-editor
for allowing me to draw from our introduction in this section of the Article.
41. For a brilliant exposition of this argument, see also Ken Booth, Human Wrongs and international
Relations, 71 INT'L AFF. 103 (1995).
42. For analysis along these lines, see generally Richard Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in
GLOBAL VISIONS: BEYOND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 39-50 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993).
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globalizers." States are not universally leaking power to non-State actors.
Borders are not being dissolved. The Internet will not have transformative
capacity while access to it is denied to most of the world's population. I
suggested two responses to these overblown claims. First, there is a need for
more empirical work to trace where power lies in the global order. Second,
such an analysis must be accompanied by a more sophisticated conceptual
approach to the ontology of the global order.
The animosity presumed between the "State" and the "global" must be
unravelled and retheorized. Globalization has not transcended the complex
relationship between the universal and the particular that has framed
international politics since at least the Westphalian settlement in the mid-
seventeenth century. As Ian Clark reminds us, "globalization needs also to be
understood as a number of changes within the state, and not simply as a range
of external forces set against it."43 Human rights provides a useful case study
illustrating this ambiguity; there is an external standard of "good governance"
outside of States, but this is parasitic upon the vitality of liberalism-and
rights-based cultures-within core States. The growing cosmopolitan moral
awareness within liberal States suggests new possibilities for reconfiguring the
relationship between territory and community. Here it is important to proceed
cautiously. The locomotive of economic globalization must not be allowed
to ride roughshod over legitimate forms of cultural diversity. Those with an
academic responsibility for thinking about these questions can make an
important contribution by bringing the normative back in and recognizing the
constitutive role played by States in generating the global order.
43. CLARK, supra note 14, at 52.
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